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Algorithmic transparency is the new watchword – from the UK Parliament’s Science and Technology 
Committee (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 2016), to the European Data 
Protection Supervisor (EDPS, 2016) and even Angela Merkel (Connolly, 2016).  With the current 
controversies over fake news online, the spotlight has fallen mainly on the private sector - internet 
platforms, search engines, social media - but for how long?   
The operational deployment of algorithmic tools (computational methods that analyse data sets in 
order to draw conclusions, increase knowledge and make links) within the U.S. criminal justice 
system has provoked considerable debate.  Third party proprietary systems used for parole and 
sentencing decisions have been accused of hardwiring discrimination into the system (ProPublica, 
2016) and raise issues of natural justice and procedural fairness (Oswald & Grace, 2016). 
Predictive database-driven tools for offender management in the probation and prison contexts 
have been used in the UK for several years (NAMS, 2015).  However, the extent to which algorithmic 
tools have been adopted within UK policing for investigative operations and intelligence analysis 
appears to vary significantly between forces and be less than transparent.  For instance, a search on 
Kent Police’s website for predictive policing tool ‘PredPol’ brings up no results, despite coverage of 
the force’s deployment of the algorithmic technology in the UK press (see for instance O’Donoghue, 
2016).    
My freedom of information-based study (with Jamie Grace, Sheffield Hallam) into algorithmic 
analysis of police intelligence in the UK (Oswald & Grace, 2016) suggested that a relatively small 
number of forces were using computational or algorithmic intelligence analysis.  Although, due to 
the limitation of such studies, this is unlikely to represent a complete perspective, the results may 
still give support to James’s conclusion in October’s blog (James, 2016) that the institution is ‘failing 
to make the best use of its intelligence’ and so is ‘not working smart enough.’ 
Responses from UK police forces to our freedom of information request indicated that algorithmic 
tools were used both at the ‘macro’ level – for instance, assessing crime patterns – and at the ‘micro’ 
level such as for decision-making or risk assessment relating to individuals.  Detail was lacking 
however, with no details as to the specific crimes, activities, schemes or laws that were the focus of 
the tools.  For instance, it would not be possible to determine from the responses whether the tools 
were used to assist decisions pursuant to the preventative disclosure schemes ‘Clare’s Law’ and 
‘Sarah’s Law’.   The reasons for using such technology were expressed in general terms, and the 
exemptions under the UK’s Freedom of Information Act engaged by many forces may disguise other 
uses of such tools, or, importantly, gaps in operational capability.   
In response to our freedom of information request, thirty-two responses used some form of 
exemption.  Twenty-seven responses cited the Section 23 absolute exemption: ‘Information supplied 
by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters’ - MI5, MI6, GCHQ and so on - outnumbering 
the use of the Section 31 exemption (Law enforcement) cited by only five responses.  The Section 31 
exemption was combined with the Section 23 exemption four out of the five times that Section 31 
was used.  Section 23 was most often cited on its own rather than being combined with other 
exemptions.   
 Most (although not all) responses that cited Section 23 combined it with ‘neither confirm nor deny’ 
wording, which should be used when either confirming or denying would reveal exempt information 
in itself.  Section 31 is a qualified exemption, requiring the public body to engage in a public interest 
balancing exercise to decide whether or not to release the requested information.  There were 
considerable inconsistencies in the way that forces handled this balancing exercise, with some forces 
providing rather generic arguments either way, and one providing only a bland statement that a test 
had been completed. 
 
So what can we take from this?  The inconsistent use of FOI exemptions may allow sensitive 
information to be inadvertently exposed or gaps in capability inferred, which could be damaging to 
law enforcement and national security interests.  However, if one thing can be learned from the 
debate surrounding the Investigatory Powers Bill, it is that the adoption of new technology by the 
State without appropriate transparency around methods can result in damage to public trust as well 
as legal challenge.   
Operational details and methods must be protected.  Yet balanced transparency is also vital. 
Examples of such balanced transparency exist, for example in Canada, where, while a detailed 
understanding of the Violent Crime Linkage System (ViCLAS) 'is quite rightly not in the public 
domain due to investigative sensitivities - but official, clear, easy to find information on what the 
system is, who can use it, how to go about access and related research is available' (Dawson and 
Stanko, 2016). 
The Investigatory Powers Bill is in itself an example (in some eyes a flawed one) of an attempt to 
achieve balanced transparency and oversight.  As the use of algorithmic tools within UK policing 
appears to be at a fairly early stage, now would seem to be the right time to assess the legal 
underpinning and the governance framework, and to ensure that appropriate transparency is 
built into contracts with third party software suppliers.  Such an exercise may help to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of these tools, as well as increasing public trust and so could 
contribute towards James’s call for the institution to make the best use of its intelligence.  
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